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Politics After MacIntyre 
 
 
Philip Devine 
Providence College 
 
 
“I give my political loyalty to no program.” 
—Alasdair MacIntyre (K p. 265)1 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 Alasdair MacIntyre is known for his root-and-branch rejection of 
liberalism (which includes many of the political philosophies called 
conservative).
2
  Neatly synthesizing Left and Right critiques of liberalism, he 
has observed:  
 
Liberalism, while imposing through state power regimes that declare 
everybody free to pursue whatever they take to be their own good, 
deprives most people of the possibility of understanding their lives as 
a quest for the discovery and achievement of the good, especially by 
the way in which it attempts to discredit those traditional forms of 
human community within which the project has to be embodied.  (K 
p. 258) 
 
 It is the poor and the ill-educated, as well as marginal groups such as 
Native Americans,
3
 who have the greatest need for tradition in the guidance of 
their lives. In one sense at least MacIntyre is a radical; he is not concerned 
only with questions of distribution of acknowledged goods, but also with 
challenges to prevailing understandings of well-being that condition what are 
thought to be benefits and burdens.     
                                                          
1 K = Kelvin Knight, ed., The MacIntyre Reader (Notre Dame, IN:  University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1998). 
 
2 I use “liberal” to refer to the political tradition that begins with John Locke; “Liberal” 
refers to the Left wing of the American Democratic Party. 
 
3 Jeffery L. Nichols, Reason, Tradition, and the Good (Notre Dame, IN:  University of 
Notre Dame Press, 2012), esp. pp. 14-15, 146-47, 155-56, 162-63, and 207-10, fills a 
gap in MacIntyre’s account of tradition by appeal to the Lakota Sioux.  Unfortunately, 
institutions designed to protect Native American traditions have been cynically 
exploited to support casino gambling.   
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 In this essay I will accept MacIntyre’s Aristotelianism and the 
critique of liberal society he uses it to support, and examine how his views can 
be translated into practice. It is true that American liberalism is often 
hegemonic: It devotes itself to achieving by indirect means the de-
Christianizing aims of the French Enlightenment revolutionaries, which 
corrupts our understanding of human well-being by the resulting commercial 
society.
4
 It is also true, though, that our tradition of religious freedom is strong 
and can accommodate MacIntyrean communities of virtue—at least if they 
define themselves as religious. It is my contention that, despite MacIntyre’s 
trenchant critique of liberalism, a liberal political system and only a liberal 
political system, has the resources needed for nonstate communities of virtue 
to survive and flourish.  Since MacIntyre rightly holds that understanding a 
philosophical problem requires examining its history, the first step in my 
inquiry will be a look at his Marxist past.
5
    
 
2.  MacIntyre as Marxist 
 MacIntyre’s present position as a Catholic both preserves important 
features of and attempts to correct perceived inadequacies in his Marxist past.   
His Marxism had the following features:   
 
(1) A constant theme in the development of MacIntyre’s philosophy, both 
in his Marxist and his post-Marxist periods, is that it is not a mere 
theoretical reflection, but requires translation into practice (see, e.g., E pp. 
103, 422, and 424).
6 
 
 
 (2) MacIntyre’s Marxism was democratic, regarding the bureaucratic 
collectivism that prevailed in the former Soviet Union as a profound 
betrayal of the Marxist cause.  
 
(3) It was international, opposed to any version of “socialism in one 
country” (E chap. 26).  
 
(4) It was anti-reformist, arguing that the capitalist system had the power 
to absorb and pervert any change (E chaps. 19, 23, 30, and 32). 
 
(5) It rejected the construction of utopian enclaves, whether socialist (E 
chap. 9) or Christian (E chap. 18) in inspiration. 
                                                          
4 See Robert Skidelsky and Edward Skidelsky, How Much Is Enough? (New York:  
Other Press, 2012). 
 
5 I am indebted to the editors of Reason Papers for pointing out my need to explain 
this point. 
 
6 E = Paul Blackledge and Neil Davidson, eds., Alasdair MacIntyre’s Engagement with 
Marxism (Chicago, IL:  Haymarket, 2009).   
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(6) Putting the previous three points together, it was committed both to 
transforming the whole world and to transforming it wholly. In jargon, his 
was a “maximalist” version of Marxism; in this, he followed Leon 
Trotsky. 
 
(7) He regarded the socialist project as a historical failure.  He concluded: 
“The central question about socialism is whether the tragedy sprang 
merely from local circumstances . . . or from deeper and more permanent 
factors in the life of the working class and of socialist parties and groups” 
(E p. 393).   
 
(8) His evaluation of the historical situation led to some difficult moral 
and political judgments (see, e.g., E pp. 43, 52, 61-62, and 67). For 
example, exactly what was wrong with the political justice employed by 
the victorious Soviets after the Hungarian Revolution, and right about that 
of Fidel Castro (K p. 48)? 
 
(9) The upshot of his argument was that “those who make the conquest of 
state power their aim are always, in the end, conquered by it” (E p. 416).  
  
 Nonetheless, phenomena such as wealth polarization; the shameless 
marketing of expensive, unneeded goods
7
; the disproportionate political 
power of the top one percent; the collapse of law into the use of judicial power 
in defense of the privileges of the rich
8
; the extrajudicial killing of foes of the 
regime, even of an American citizen
9
; and anti-terrorist measures that go 
beyond what the (admittedly chaotic) laws of war can be stretched to 
justify
10—all suggest that Marxism retains its relevance.  The recent best-
                                                          
7 See Pamela Danziger, Why People Buy Things They Don’t Need (Chicago, IL:  
Dearborn Trade, 2004). 
 
8 The controversial case of Citizens United v. FCC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), seems to me 
worse than its critics suppose.  Neither the majority nor the dissenters understood the, 
to me, elementary distinction between a group of citizens supporting a common cause 
and a business corporation donating to both sides of an election so as to have friends in 
office whoever wins. 
 
9 On the killing of U.S. citizen Anwar al-Awlaki, see Tom Leonard, “Barack Obama 
Orders Killing of US Cleric Anwar al-Awlaki,” Telegraph (April 7, 2010), accessed 
online at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/barackobama/7564581/Barack-
Obama-orders-killing-of-US-cleric-Anwar-al-Awlaki.html.  
 
10 Chris Woods and Christina Lamb, “Obama Terror Drones: CIA Tactics in Pakistan 
Include Targeting Rescuers and Funerals,” Bureau of Investigative Journalism 
(February 4, 2012), accessed online at: 
http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2012/02/04/obama-terror-drones-cia-tactics-in-
pakistan-include-targeting-rescuers-and-funerals/; Chris Woods, “Over 160 Children 
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selling work by Thomas Piketty is not in the strict sense Marxist; it insists that 
economics be done in conjunction with the other social sciences rather than 
controlling their results,
11
 and finds a useful and possibly irreplaceable role for 
private property and the market.
12
 Yet it is close enough to Karl Marx in its 
central argument to preclude a requiem for Marxism. In Piketty’s own words, 
“the primary purpose of the capital tax is not to finance the social state but to 
regulate capitalism.”13   
 Moreover, Trotskyists have sometimes proved politically significant.  
Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez described himself as a Trotskyist.
14
 
Chávez’s claim met with a mixed reception among the faithful,15 however, 
and in characteristic Latin fashion he returned to the Church before his 
death.
16
  On the other hand, his followers continue the tradition of replacing 
God with a political movement, at the risk of emperor worship.
17
 
                                                                                                                              
Reported among Drone Deaths,” Bureau of Investigative Journalism  (April 11, 2011), 
accessed online at: http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2011/08/11/more-than-160-
children-killed-in-us-strikes/;  Chris Woods, “Drone War Exposed–the Complete 
Picture of CIA Strikes in Pakistan,” Bureau of Investigative Journalism (August 10, 
2011), accessed online at: http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2011/08/10/most-
complete-picture-yet-of-cia-drone-strikes/.  On the legal issues, see David Kretzmer, 
“Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists,” European Journal of International Law 16, 
no. 2 (2005), pp. 171-212.  On the efforts of the United States to evade accountability 
for such actions, see Philip Alston, Jason Morgan-Foster, and William Abreach, “The 
Competence of the UN Human Rights Council and Its Special Procedures in Relation 
to Armed Conflicts,”  European Journal of International Law 19, no. 1 (2008), pp. 
183-209. 
11 Thomas Pikkety, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, trans. Arthur Goldhammer 
(Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 2014), p. 32.  He writes, “I see 
economics as a subdiscipline of the social sciences, alongside history, sociology, 
anthropology and political science” (p. 573). Celia Wolf-Devine pointed out to me the 
importance of this departure from Marx. 
 
12 Ibid., pp. 531-32. 
 
13 Ibid., p. 518. 
 
14 Nathalie Malinarich, “Chavez Accelerates on Path to Socialism,” BBC News 
(January 10, 2007).  
 
15 See Jorge Martin, “‘What is the problem? I am also a Trotskyist!’ Chavez Is Sworn 
in as President of Venezuela,” In Defense of Marxism (January 12, 2007), accessed 
online at: http://www.marxist.com/chavez-trotskyist-president120107.htm; and 
“Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez Calls for Fifth International,” League for the 
Fifth International (November 25, 2009), accessed online at: 
http://www.fifthinternational.org/content/venezuelas-president-hugo-chavez-calls-
fifth-international.  
 
16 “Hugo Chavez Died ‘within the Church’,” ACI Prensa (March 6, 2013), accessed 
online at: https://www.aciprensa.com/noticiaf.php?url=hugo-chavez-murio-en-el-seno-
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  In any event, the number of Marxist true believers falls far below 
their aspirations, for their insistence on doctrinal purity keeps Marxist groups 
small.   No one has explained, except by an appeal to Providence smuggled in 
through G. W. F. Hegel, how if capitalism collapses, anything but Stalinist (or 
other) barbarism will ensue.  The question of the legitimacy of social power, 
manifested among other places in the rivalry between political and economic 
elites, is in any event crucial.   
  The key theoretical text here is the third of Marx’s Theses on 
Feuerbach: 
 
The materialist doctrine that men are the products of circumstances 
and upbringing, and that, therefore, changed men are products of 
other circumstances and changed upbringing, forgets that it is men 
who change circumstances and that the educator himself needs 
educating. Hence the doctrine necessarily arrives at dividing society 
into two parts, one of which is superior to society.
18
 
 
The word “men” here is generic; there are many women who take a fiercely 
elitist approach, especially concerning issues such as sexuality, sexual 
difference, and family structure. 
 Workingmen and women have understandably preferred the relief of 
present distress to long-term goals; they have also preferred national or other 
sectional solidarities to solidarity with all workingmen and women 
everywhere.   Thus arises the dilemma of socialist leadership: whether the 
socialist elite should regard itself as above the working class and manipulate 
them or immerse themselves in the working class and attempt to give voice to 
their interests as workingmen and women themselves understand them. In 
neither case will the perspective of Marxist intellectuals and their working 
class constituency be identical.   In either case they will water down or betray 
the socialist project.  
 For those Marxists who could not swallow Stalinist orthodoxy, it 
turned out that “Marxism is only a theory, only an idea, it lacks any material 
incarnation” (E p. 320).  Yet from his Marxist past MacIntyre retains both a 
critique of liberalism (hence also a critique of capitalism) and a demand for a 
                                                                                                                              
de-la-iglesia-12000/#U5oKolvdWSo.  
 
17 See “Venezuela: Catholic Church Denounces Lord’s Prayer to Hugo Chavez,” 
Euronews (September 7, 2014), accessed online at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a5qMvtjKNhA.  
 
18 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy, ed. 
Lewis S. Feuer (New York:  Anchor Books, 1959), p. 244.  For MacIntyre’s comments 
on this thesis,  see K pp. 229-30; for further discussion see Christopher Stephen Lutz, 
“MacIntyre’s Tradition-Constituted Inquiry,” American Catholic Philosophical 
Quarterly 85, no. 3 (Summer 2011), pp. 396-97. 
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philosophy capable of guiding political practice.  However frustrated it may 
be in practice, or even in theory, his radicalism is an important element of his 
outlook.
19
 
 
3. The Social Contract 
 MacIntyre’s argument against liberalism can be explicated in terms 
of the perennial problem of the transmission of the social contract.   
Liberalism—which vaunts consent—can maintain itself as a socially 
embodied tradition, persisting from generation to generation, only by methods 
that are by liberal criteria questionable. The rising generation needs to be 
attached to liberal society before its members can make up their own minds 
about the merits of liberalism and “sign” a metaphorical contract binding them 
to adhere to its rules. The resulting contract is constantly renegotiated as the 
relationship between politically active groups changes. Out-groups have to 
struggle for acceptance; when they succeed, they are transformed in the 
process—sometimes becoming oppressors in their turn.  Children, the elderly, 
and future generations lack bargaining power independent of the conventions 
of liberal society and thus are always at a disadvantage.   
 In his response to this situation, MacIntyre looks for virtuous 
communities governed by their own traditions of excellence, though not, as 
we shall see, completely isolated from other communities.  In my evaluation, I 
shall neither ignore nor be bound by MacIntyre’s political positions; though 
MacIntyre may know his own thought better than anyone else does, he is not 
infallible concerning its interpretation and application.  The key issue is what 
the relationship is between such communities and a larger society whose 
standards are defined by contract among people who may share little or 
nothing in their concept of the good.   
 
4. Catholic Separatism 
 Benjamin Smith and Thaddeus Kozinski respond to MacIntyre’s 
argument by using his philosophy to revive the political theology or 
theological politics defended by St. Thomas Aquinas in a different historical 
context.
20
   In practice, this appears to mean, in Smith’s words:  
 
Contemporary Christians should advocate radical political 
decentralization, so that practical political life can be relocated onto 
                                                          
19 I am indebted to Celia Wolf-Devine for pointing out the need to clarify my line of 
argument here. 
 
20 Benjamin Smith, “Political Theology and Thomas Aquinas,” Proceedings of the 
American Catholic Philosophical Association 84 (2010), pp. 99-112; Thaddeus J. 
Kozinski, The Political Problem of Religious Pluralism (Lanham, MD: Lexington 
Books, 2011). For a contrary view, see John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights 
(Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1980); and John Finnis, Aquinas (Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press, 1998). 
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the local level where it is more likely that we will find—or be able to 
create—communities of organic Christian solidarity capable of 
naturally developing and supporting forms of Christian politics.
21
 
 
 In other words, Christians should secede from a pluralistic society, or 
form autonomous enclaves, and develop Christian laws and institutions within 
its autonomous sphere.  We thus encounter the question of secession, which 
has received a great deal of contemporary discussion,
22
  but which I will not 
pursue further here. In practice, there will have to be some standards 
governing the relationship between Catholic communities and the non-
Catholic world (and likewise for intentional communities founded on other 
principles).  
 In any case, MacIntyre does not accept Thomistic restorationism and 
its counsel to separate Catholic communities from the larger society.  In a 
recent article, he has written:  
 
Newman as a historian remarked on the fact that political 
establishment of the church has been bad for the church, often very 
bad indeed.  [If so,] . . . then we have strong theistic reasons for 
holding that in political society [no religious association] . . . should 
be established. So, although for a very different reason from the 
secularizers, theists can and should be in favor of political forums in 
which a variety of theistic and other voices can be heard.
23
     
                                                          
21 Smith, “Political Theology,” p. 111 n. 33. 
 
22 The most important theoretical discussion is Allen Buchanan, Secession (Boulder, 
CO:  Westview, 1991).  For discussion from a variety of contemporary perspectives, 
see David Gordon, ed., Secession, State, and Liberty (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 
Publishers, 1998); Margaret Moore, “The Ethics of Secession and Postinvasion Iraq,” 
Ethics & International Affairs 20, no. 1 (March 1, 2006), pp. 55ff.; Don H. Doyle, ed., 
Secession as an International Phenomenon (Athens, GA:  University of Georgia Press, 
2010); Brion McClanahan, “Is Secession Legal?” American Conservative (December 
7, 2012), accessed online at:  http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/is-
secession-legal/; Scott Malone, “Exclusive: Angry with Washington, 1 in 4 Americans 
Open to Secession,” Reuters (September 20, 2014), accessed online at: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-secession-exclusive-
idUSKBN0HE19U20140920; Susan Eaton, “How a ‘New Secessionist’ Movement Is 
Threatening to Worsen School Segregation and Widen Inequalities,” The Nation (May 
15, 2014), accessed online at:  http://www.thenation.com/article/179870/how-new-
secessionist-movement-threatening-worsen-school-segregation-and-widen-inequal#; 
and Jonathan Rauch, “The Great Secession,” The Atlantic (July/August 2014), 
accessed online at: http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/07/the-great-
secession/372288/.   
 
23 Alasdair MacIntyre, “On Being a Theistic Philosopher in a Secularized Culture,” 
Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 84 (2010), p. 25. 
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 In other words, the situation of a church which dominates a mini-
state will be spiritually unhealthy; awareness of, and interaction with, 
communities founded on different principles will help the community pursue 
its understanding of the good life.  We here have an analogue of a standard 
liberal point about the individual: we define ourselves by sometimes learning 
from and sometimes resisting the influence of others, including those of 
whose way of life we deeply disapprove. This doctrine is not, however, as 
tolerant as it appears.
24
 One’s initial response to the Other is likely to be 
hostile, and further acquaintance may either refine or intensify this response.  
Americans of my generation were taught to define our national identity in 
contrast with Nazis.  Though Protestants and Catholics have lived together for 
centuries in Ulster, as late as 1988 Ian Paisley denounced the Pope as the anti-
Christ in the European Parliament.
25
  Of course, not all examples involve such 
stark hostility. I can exist on friendly terms with representatives of the Other, 
but some distance is still implied.  Familiarity with members of an alien group 
may lead a person to view them as individuals, but not necessarily to liking 
them more when they act together as a group.
26
 
 
5. Communities of Virtue 
 MacIntyre’s solution is at least to modify his earlier anti-utopianism 
and to call for the creation of virtuous—or as I sometimes call them, 
“intentional”—communities. Each such community is founded on what John 
Rawls has called a comprehensive view,
27
 and each has its accompanying 
tradition and array of virtues and practices.  These communities, though, will 
inevitably interact with other communities and with the larger society. 
MacIntyre goes further to argue that some such interaction is necessary to 
their health. Some jurists suggest a “rizomorphic” process of interaction 
among these communities.
28
  (The word “rizomorphic” is taken from Gilles 
                                                          
24 For an example of confusion on this point, see Andrew Sullivan, “Alone Again, 
Naturally,” in Eugene F. Rogers, ed., Theology and Sexuality (Malden, MA:  
Blackwell, 2002), p. 286:  “Extinguishing—or prohibiting—homosexuality is . . . not a 
virtuous necessity, but the real crime against nature, a refusal to accept the pied beauty 
of God’s creation, a denial of the way in which the other need not threaten, but may 
even give depth and contrast to the self.” 
 
25 “Ian Paisley Heckles the Pope” (March 31, 2012), accessed online at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JlbmIMbKZa4. 
 
26 I am here indebted to Celia Wolf-Devine. 
 
27 See John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York:  Columbia University Press, 
1996). 
 
28 Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Guenther Tuebner, “Regime Collisions:  The Vain 
Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law,” Michigan Journal of 
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Deleuze and Felix Guattari, and refers originally to the branching roots of 
certain fungi.
29
) Outsiders will not consider all of them virtuous; some of them 
will be considered cults or criminal conspiracies, and some of these rightly 
so.
30
 Sometimes, the relationship between an intentional community and the 
larger society has ended in blood. While virtuous communities need not be 
religious in the usual sense, I shall discuss faith-based communities here, 
since they represent most of Americans’ relevant experience.   
 MacIntyre has recommended that a virtuous community should be 
“wary and antagonistic in all its dealings with the state and the market 
economy” (K p. 252), but he has not explored the necessities of a politics of 
self-defense. Even if the members of an intentional community were to gain 
control of a nation-state or some part of one, they would still have to deal with 
the pressures of the European Union on its constituent states,
31
 American 
imperial power on all states other than the “hyperpower,” and the global 
market economy on everyone.    
 In America, the ways in which the larger society impinges on a 
virtuous community go well beyond the Health and Human Services mandates 
and prohibitions on sexual-orientation discrimination that have received a 
great deal of press. Limiting ourselves to state action for the time being, the 
federal privacy regulations for health care have a serious impact on religious 
communities’ access to their seriously ill members. In order to fend off threats 
from the larger society without bloodshed, virtuous communities will have to 
develop a constitutional apologetics, invoking such stock liberal ideas as 
freedom of association and freedom of religion and conscience. It will also be 
necessary to support the rule of law: If controversial religious and political 
figures can be executed or detained indefinitely without trial, let alone 
tortured, the most scrupulous constitutional protections will be futile.
32
 One 
issue that needs to be considered is the rights of dissident members. It seems 
that they must have at least a right to exit, and there are those who question 
                                                                                                                              
International Law 25, no. 4 (2004), pp. 999-1046.  
 
29 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1987), pp. 3-25. 
 
30  For a relatively unknown example, see Bruce Falconer, “The Torture Colony,” 
American Scholar (September 1, 2008), accessed online at: 
http://theamericanscholar.org/the-torture-
colony/?gclid=CNvEmKGgnq8CFScTNAodlyV_6w. 
31 See my “The Concept of Europe,” delivered at the 2010 meeting of the International 
Society for MacIntyrean Enquiry (Vilnius, Lithuania), accessed online at: 
https://philipdevine.wordpress.com/2010/08/09/europe/.    
32 Pilate, as judge, acquitted Jesus; as governor, he ordered his crucifixion. 
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whether even this is sufficient.
33
  The chief problems are two:  (1) whether the 
departing member will have sufficient resources to live elsewhere, and if not, 
whether he or she has a right to a share of the community’s collective 
property; and (2) whether it is possible to escape one’s cultural formation.  An 
ex-Catholic, an ex-Fundamentalist, and an ex-Mormon remain distinctive 
sorts of people. 
 Even if the state is scrupulously respectful and the problem of the 
dissident member is satisfactorily resolved, the economic and psychological 
pressures of the larger society will bear on the dissident community 
generation after generation.  Hence, there is a constant need to persuade the 
rising generation that the enterprise is worth continuing, which will mean 
continuing to persuade the adult adherents also (since children can scent latent 
skepticism in their elders). Moreover, as MacIntyre has acknowledged, 
children require both stable family structures and enough to eat if they are to 
learn, both of which require a community to forsake virtuous poverty and 
secure adequate economic resources.
34
 
 In brief, a community of virtue is doubly precarious, especially if it 
attempts to withstand not only permissive sexual mores, but also the all-
pervasive solicitations of the consumer society. The larger society will 
persistently put formal and informal pressures on it.  Its younger members will 
have to be taught to believe in the community’s understanding of virtue and 
resist the ever-present allure of what the community considers vice. 
   There is a great need for dialogue between MacIntyre’s admirers and 
those Jewish spokesmen who take their tradition seriously and can reflect on 
long experience as a minority culture. However, the one avowedly Jewish 
spokesman I know of who has addressed MacIntyre falsely accuses him of 
devotion to the status quo.
35
 MacIntyre unfortunately feeds Jewish suspicions 
by his use of the Soviet Russian expression “rootless cosmopolitans” (K p. 
135), which originated in a Slavophile campaign against Western influence 
but whose target was subsequently narrowed to Jews.
36
 The same reasons that 
                                                          
33 For example, see Kwame Anthony Appiah, The Ethics of Identity (Princeton, NJ:  
Princeton University Press, 2005), pp. 77-79. 
 
34 See Alasdair MacIntyre, “How Aristotelianism Can Become Revolutionary,” in Paul 
Blackledge and Kelvin Knight, eds., Virtue and Politics (Notre Dame, IN:  University 
of Notre Dame Press, 2011), pp. 15ff. 
 
35 Hilary Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 
1992), pp. 185-86; for MacIntyre’s reply, see K p. 25.  For a Jewish spokesman open 
to dialogue with Catholics, though not specifically with MacIntyre, see Matthew 
Berke, “A Jewish Appreciation of Catholic Social Teaching,” in Kenneth L. Grasso, 
Gerard V. Bradley, and Robert P. Hunt, eds., Catholicism, Liberalism, and 
Communitarianism (Lanham, MD:   Rowman and Littlefield, 1995), chap. 13.  
 
36 See Konstantin Azadovski and Boris Egatov, “From Anti-Westernism to Anti-
Semitism,” Journal of Cold War Studies 4, no. 1 (Winter 2002), pp. 66-80. 
Reason Papers Vol. 37, no. 2 
 
143 
 
dictate dialogue with Jews also dictate dialogue with Muslims and Latter Day 
Saints.  In every case, the communities face the same problem:  maintaining 
and transmitting a cultural tradition in an uncomprehending and sometimes 
hostile social environment.  All face the same temptations:  capitulation or a 
repellent form of sectarian rigidity. 
 
6. Modus Vivendi Liberal or Civic Republican? 
 So far we have politics as usual, though viewed from the angle of the 
ideal more than the material interests of competing groups.  Politics as usual 
contains various forms of coalition, from single-purpose alliances to the sort 
of robust alliance needed to support core liberal institutions (free expression, 
regular elections, and the rule of law)—the sort of thing Rawls calls an 
overlapping consensus. It also contains more or less stable forms of enmity. In 
technical language, MacIntyre’s argument ends up supporting modus vivendi 
liberalism, for which “‘civil peace’ is not preceded by the adjective ‘mere’.”37  
Intentional communities will have to live together; though they are likely 
strongly to advocate their views, they are unlikely to convert all of the others.  
Even the seemingly narrow differences between Roman Catholicism and 
Eastern Orthodoxy persist.  The alternative to dialogue is endless war. 
 Yet MacIntyre goes beyond modus vivendi liberalism, or in other 
words beyond the requirements of civil peace, to value dialogue among rival 
traditions.  He favors a society that “will ask what is to be learned from . . . 
dissenters.  It will therefore not only tolerate dissent, but enter into rational 
conversation with it and cultivate as political virtue not merely a passive 
tolerance, but an active and enquiring attitude toward  radically dissenting 
views” (K p. 251). This remark balances the defensive drift of the argument so 
far and provides a useful counterweight to demands, which sometimes claim 
MacIntyre’s authority, for universities dominated by their theology 
departments and in which intellectual rigor is subordinated to piety.
38
   
 Such an approach does not help much, however, in dealing with the 
intellectual battles to which the culture wars give birth. What is lacking is 
training in argument of a sort that will not be instantly rejected by outsiders to 
one’s political or metaphysical perspective.39  Such dialogue is not merely part 
of MacIntyre’s intellectual program; it is also a practical necessity. 
 I do not assume that tradition-transcending intellectual standards are 
available, only that there is some overlap between the standards of adherents 
                                                                                                                              
 
37 Patrick Neal, “Vulgar Liberalism,” Political Theory 21, no. 4 (November 1993), p. 
638.  See also John Gray, Two Faces of Liberalism (New York:  New Press, 2000). 
 
38 A possible representative of this tradition is Reinhard Hütter, “The University’s 
Cutting Edge—Sources of Its Flatness,” Logos 15, no 4 (Fall 2012), pp. 36-56. 
   
39 See Alasdair MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry:  Encylopaedia, 
Genealogy, and Tradition (Notre Dame, IN:  University of Notre Dame Press, 1990). 
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of one tradition and those of adherents of another. Some believers and some 
unbelievers can agree, for example, that one should engage an opponent as 
charitably as possible, at least until his bad faith is proved beyond reasonable 
doubt.
40
 
 Some intentional communities will endeavor to transform the 
larger society in accordance with its conceptions of justice and the good for 
human beings.   Since a MacIntyrean community is on all accounts very 
small, a “city on the hill” strategy—inducing others to imitate one’s 
community by one’s success in achieving one’s ideal—seems the only way of 
so doing.
41
 This will be especially true in marriage and family life, especially 
insofar as successful child-rearing will require grandparents, aunts and uncles, 
and celibate orders with a teaching mission (or their functional equivalent).
42
   
  We therefore need a communitarian form of Civic Republicanism in 
which representatives of various intentional communities agree to co-exist 
under shared laws, provide at least for mutual non-aggression, and concur in 
valuing a free society so understood.
43
 The core of Civic Republicanism is a 
shared understanding of reason that is thicker than Rawls’s “public reason,” 
but thinner than those embodied in his “comprehensive views.”  Likewise, it 
includes an understanding of virtue more demanding than ethical minimalism, 
but not so rich as the ideals of sanctity to which adherents of religions and 
religion-like movements aspire. The usual liberal apparatus of courts will also 
be necessary in order to adjudicate boundary conflicts between various sorts 
of community. There is some reason to hope that the American judiciary can 
be moved in the desired direction, though the battle will have to be fought.
44
  
                                                          
40 Readers tempted to despair about the possibility of dialogue across ideological 
boundaries should read Thomas Nagel’s recent review of Alvin Plantinga. See Thomas 
Nagel, “A Philosopher Defends Religion,” New York Review of Books (September 27, 
2012), accessed online at:  
www.nybooks.com/articles/archives2012/sep/27/philosopher-defends-
religion/?pagination=false#fnr-2.  I am indebted to J. S. Ryshpan for this reference. 
 
41 Frances Fitzgerald, Cities on a Hill (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), 
provides thick descriptions of four radically different contemporary American 
communities, each of them in its own way disturbing. 
 
42 For an account of education that emphasizes the extended family, see John O’Neill, 
The Missing Child in Liberal Theory (Toronto:  University of Toronto Press, 1994). 
 
43 On Civic Republicanism, see Philip Pettit, “Liberal/Communitarian: MacIntyre’s 
Mesmeric Dichotomy,” in John Horton and Susan Mendus, eds., After MacIntyre 
(Notre Dame, IN:  University of Notre Dame Press, 1994). 
 
44 The recent unanimous decision in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church, 
138 S.Ct. 694 (2012) and the narrowly decided Hobby Lobby decision, 134 S.Ct. 2751 
(2014), are from a MacIntyrean perspective hopeful.  A constitutional lawyer who 
supports a broadly MacIntyrean approach to religious freedom is Steven D. Smith, The 
Rise and Decline of American Religious Freedom (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard 
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For the American tradition of religious freedom is strong and has shown itself 
willing to accommodate the wide range of different forms of religion that have 
always existed within its borders. Even the Mormons, who were at one time 
systematically persecuted, have done well eventually, in important part 
because they have had large numbers of healthy children. What needs to be 
emphasized is the communal dimension of religious freedom: the right to 
form, join, and maintain communities whose views may in important ways be 
different from the larger society. According to its own spokesmen, what first 
spurred the Religious New Right was governmental threats to Christian 
schools and, more broadly, “the realization that there are no enclaves in this 
society.”45 
 The Christian Right appeals to the idea of Christian America. Some 
critics have emphasized America’s religious diversity, to the point where they 
find a chaos on which neither tolerance nor anything else can be built.
46
  
Others point to the Deism of many of the founding generation (in the process 
confusing Deism, pantheism, and atheism) and claim that the Declaration of 
Independence’s appeal to “Nature’s God”  “really stands for the emancipation 
of the political order from God,” as if the British Empire were a theocracy.47 
That people in the eighteenth century were frequently guilty of confusing 
Deism, pantheism, and atheism, is no excuse for doing so ourselves.  
 Although relations between Catholics and conservative Bible 
Christians
48
 have recently become friendlier, Fundamentalism is not in favor 
in the Vatican.
49
 There are politically important tensions among 
                                                                                                                              
University Press, 2014), though he limits himself to the claims of the church, broadly 
understood (pp. 163-66). 
 
45 Edward G. Dobson, “Comments on Robert Wuthnow: ‘The Future of the Religious 
Right’,” in Michael Cromartie, ed., No Longer Exiles (Washington, DC:  Ethics and 
Public Policy Center, 1993), p. 51; likewise Paul Weyrich, “Comments on George 
Marsden, ‘An Overview’,” in ibid., p. 26. 
 
46 Peter Manseau, One Nation under Gods (New York:  Little, Brown, 2015), makes 
this case; he writes at length of events in Latin America and elsewhere, which are not 
properly a part of the history of the United States; see ibid., esp. chap. 2.  
 
47 Matthew Stewart, Nature’s God (New York:  Norton, 2014), esp. pp. 5-7.  
 
48 I use “Conservative Bible Christians” to refer to Evangelicals, Fundamentalists, and 
Pentecostals; and “Religious New Right” and “Religious Conservatives” to refer to the 
political movement some such people have launched, which some Roman Catholics 
and Jews have also joined. 
 
49 Pope Francis has said: “In ideologies there is not Jesus: in his tenderness, his love, 
his meekness. And ideologies are rigid, always . . . . And when a Christian becomes a 
disciple of the ideology, he has lost the faith: he is no longer a disciple of Jesus, he is a 
disciple of this attitude of thought . . . . For this reason Jesus said to them: ‘You have 
taken away the key of knowledge.’ The knowledge of Jesus is transformed into an 
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Fundamentalists, Pentecostalists, and Evangelicals—and Baptists cover the 
political, theological, and cultural waterfront.  In brief, American history and 
demographics do not support a claim by Southern Baptists to be the legitimate 
rulers of the country.  Nonetheless, American religion has been predominantly 
Christian, if often unorthodox.
50
 The Deists among the Founding Fathers kept 
quiet for that reason. The alternative to Christianity for most Americans has 
been not some other faith, but hedonism and acquisitiveness.   
 Speaking as an American rather than as a philosopher, I hope that 
Christian, Jewish, Islamic, Hindu, and Buddhist communities of virtue are 
entitled to a welcome on these shores.  As for those eccentric groups called 
“cults,” the problems they pose need to be addressed case by case. The bloody 
climax of the drama of the Branch Davidians, including the deaths of many 
children whom the government was supposedly protecting against abuse, 
presents an exemplar of what must at all costs be avoided.
51
 Groups that 
refuse to be called religious, such as the Trotskyists with whom MacIntyre 
was once associated, can claim the substantial (but not necessarily identical) 
protections provided by freedom of speech and the press, provided that the 
government does not circumvent these protections by acting against them 
outside the law.  (We are then talking not politics, but war.)  
 The framework that makes such mutual accommodation possible can 
expect wide though not universal support. (New Atheists and extreme 
Fundamentalists would not sign on.)  Even America’s debilitated civil religion 
might lend support to freedom of conscience. For what distinguishes 
conscientious objection to war or abortion from emotional aversion is that it is 
either the voice of God in the soul or else that of some Reality that serves the 
function of God in the conscientious person’s life, even if the nature of this 
moral source has not received clear articulation.  (There is no doubt that some 
atheists have powerful consciences.) 
 MacIntyre and his admirers need to choose between modus vivendi 
liberalism (which differs from the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes only in that 
the danger feared is not the war of each against all, but the even more 
destructive war of tribe against tribe) and Civic Republicanism. The form that 
                                                                                                                              
ideological and also moralistic knowledge, because these close the door with many 
requirements. The faith becomes ideology and ideology frightens, ideology chases 
away the people, distances, distances the people and distances of the Church of the 
people”; see  Stephen D. Foster, Jr., “Pope Francis Takes Aim at Ideologically 
Obsessed Christians,” Addicting Info (October 21, 2013), accessed online at:   
http://www.addictinginfo.org/2013/10/21/pope-francis-right-wing-christians/. 
 
50 See Ross Douthat, Bad Religion (New York:  Free Press, 2012). 
 
51 See James W. Tabor and Eugene V. Gallagher, Why Waco? (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1995); Stuart A. Wright, ed., Armageddon in Waco 
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1995); and, in a more secular vein, David 
Kopel, No More Wacos (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 1997). 
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such Civic Republicanism would need to take is one in which dialogue across 
communal boundaries supports a form of public reason that legitimates liberal 
institutions and enables us to discuss their implications in practice.
52
  A shared 
belief in our need to discover what is for our good, rather than follow our 
present impulses whatever they may be, can unite people whose 
understandings of the good life are very different. 
 
7.   Rights-Talk 
 Some writers have attempted to reach an accommodation between 
MacIntyre’s philosophy and the liberal language of rights.53 Even MacIntyre, 
though notorious for his rights-skepticism, has moderated his position to allow 
for communally based claims of right.
54
 Virtually any normative framework 
can support claims of right, though rights-skeptics are right to protest the habit 
of taking such claims as self-evident deliverances of moral consciousness.  
  The appropriate frame of reference for the resulting debates is a 
minimum-claim pragmatism, which sedulously refrains from asserting that 
practice-transcending claims of truth are impossible, while abstaining from 
such claims as well. It also argues for certain rights on this basis.
55
 Yet this 
policy of abstinence will come to an inevitable end; metaphysical and 
religious issues can arise anywhere, though they need not arise everywhere.  
The greater the diversity of outlooks admitted to the conversation, the less 
reason we will have to expect convergence. 
 My argument has implications for the contested concept of the 
common good. The common good of an intentional community will be 
defined by its comprehensive view, which may contain elements derived from 
revelation as well as reason; if it does so, the community will find it easier to 
find protection from the pressures of the larger society in the American 
tradition of religious freedom. The common good of a pluralistic society will 
include the avoidance of civil war—of tribe against tribe rather than of 
individual against individual—that happens when civil conversation breaks 
down.  MacIntyre offers something richer:  He has observed that “the good 
life for man is the life spent in seeking the good life for man” (K p. 91).  
                                                          
52 This is a more latitudinarian version of Rawls’s overlapping consensus.   
 
53 For example, Michael Baur, “The Language of Rights:  An Aristotelian-Thomistic 
Analysis,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 84 (2011), 
pp. 89-98. 
 
54 See the passage from Alasdair MacIntyre, “The Return to Virtue Ethics,” in Russell 
E. Smith, ed., The Twentieth Anniversary of Vatican II (Braintree, MA:  Pope John 
Center, 1990), pp. 247-48, quoted in Baur, “The Language of Rights,” p. 90. 
 
55 For a defense of pragmatic liberalism, see Jeffrey Stout, Ethics after Babel (Boston, 
MA: Beacon Press, 1988); and Jeffrey Stout, Democracy and Tradition (Princeton, NJ:  
Princeton University Press, 2004). 
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Analogously, the common good of a pluralistic society includes a shared 
search for the common good. 
 Although these issues will require detailed discussion, MacIntyrean 
liberalism will fall closer to the Libertarian than to the Social Democratic end 
of the spectrum. Though MacIntyre shows no interest in either liberated 
morals or an alliance with the plutocracy, it is difficult to see how he could 
support a state powerful enough to engage in significant wealth redistribution 
or to limit economic inequality. His Marxist writings (E passim) are even 
pervaded by hostility toward the British Labour Party. 
    A MacIntyrean Social Democrat would have to find ways of 
circumventing deep moral disagreement, and of combating MacIntyre’s 
pessimism about public deliberation in pluralistic societies. Our understanding 
of public reason will have to be purged of any suggestion that religious 
spokesmen should be told to “sit down and shut up,” even when they attempt 
to frame their arguments in secular terms.
56
 Even in the absence of such 
prescriptive secularism, the arguments made by religious spokesmen often fail 
to persuade. 
 
8. God and Hope 
Politics takes place among human beings, whose lives are always 
larger than their spiritual beliefs. The material basis of social life is the bare 
existence of human beings. However, since we are mortal, we need to 
reproduce ourselves culturally as well as biologically. Communities of virtue, 
with the exception of celibate communities not rooted in a larger breeding 
community, will do well by this standard, at least for a broad range of 
understandings of virtue. 
 As a theistic philosopher, MacIntyre is entitled to believe in a 
transcendent source of help and hope.  But what should we hope for?  That 
God will re-activate the world proletarian revolution?  That He will rapture us 
from a decaying world at natural death or, as excitable Christians have 
supposed, at some earlier time, so that we will escape the wrath to come? That 
He will intervene and put an end to the human comedy? That we will be able 
to fight the wars of the Lord in small or large ways, without knowledge of the 
results? All of these answers and others as well have precedents in the history 
of theological politics, but the “Marxist, ex-Marxist, and post-Marxist 
audience”57 that is looking for a way to revive their old belief or fill a 
Marxism-shaped gap in their thought and practice, are certain to be 
disappointed.   
 In sum, we are back to politics as usual.  The very real limitations of 
liberalism as a political tradition do not release us from the central task 
                                                          
56  See, e.g., Philip Kitcher, The Ethical Project (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University 
Press, 2012). 
 
57 Lutz, “MacIntyre’s Tradition-Constituted Enquiry,” p. 407. 
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liberalism set itself in the breakup of Christendom: namely, creating and 
defending institutions that allow persons of a wide variety of religious, quasi-
religious, and non-religious outlooks to live together on terms of peace and, so 
far as possible, mutual respect.
58
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
58 This article is a sequel to my “The Concept of Tradition,” Reason Papers 35, no. 1 
(July 2013), pp. 107-12, and was delivered at the July 2011 meeting of the 
International Society for MacIntyrean Enquiry, the Philosophy Department at 
Providence College in March 2012, and the July 2014 meeting of the International 
Society for MacIntyrean Enquiry. I am indebted to the participants in those 
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versions of this article, and in particular to Michael Murray for putting his observations 
in writing.  I am also indebted to Celia Wolf-Devine for her comments on the final 
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